














“INFLUENCING” COPYRIGHT LAW: RE-
EVALUATING THE RIGHTS OF PHOTOGRAPHIC 
SUBJECTS IN THE INSTAGRAM AGE 
PHILIP EWING1 
 
In recent years, many lawsuits alleging copyright violations have been 
filed against celebrities who have reposted pictures of themselves taken 
by paparazzi on social media. As the inherent value of the photograph, 
which is often taken without the consent of the subject, is derived from 
the subject of the photograph, it is unfair for these photographic 
subjects to have no rights to the use of the picture, even in a limited, 
non-commercial context. This Note explores potential solutions to this 
problem and offers recommendations for copyright doctrines that could 
be used to give celebrities limited rights to use photographs of 
themselves. 
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I. Introduction  
 
Oscar Wilde reportedly once said: “The camera, you know, will never 
capture you. Photography, in my experience, has the miraculous power 
of transferring wine into water.”2 It is therefore somewhat ironic that 
one of the seminal cases that decided that photographs had artistic merits 
in the eyes of the law—and thus were worthy of copyright protection—
involved a photograph of Oscar Wilde himself.3 The case, Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, originated from a copyright infringement 
action brought by famed portrait photographer Napoleon Sarony against 
a lithographic company which had reproduced and sold copies of his 
portraits of Oscar Wilde without permission.4 The case was important 
in the legal development of photography as an art, because at the time a 
photograph was seen as the product of a machine that made a 
mechanical reproduction of the scene before it—not the product of an 
author.5 
 
The Burrow-Giles Court decided that the photograph in question was a 





2 Quote attributed to Oscar Wilde, QUOTEFANCY, https://quotefancy.com/quote/881699/Oscar-
Wilde-The-camera-you-know-will-never-capture-you-Photography-in-my-experience-has 
[https://perma.cc/A93D-EQKR]. Oscar Wilde was a famed Irish poet and dramatist who lived 
from 1854-1900, widely known for his novel The Picture of Dorian Gray. Karl Beckson, 
Oscar Wilde, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Nov. 17, 2019), 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Oscar-Wilde [https://perma.cc/7FL4-BPPU]. 
3 Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the Invention of 
Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 386 (2004). Oscar Wilde had a series of photographs 
taken shortly after his arrival in New York City for his 1882 lecture tour. John Cooper, Sarony 
Photographs, OSCAR WILDE AM., https://www.oscarwildeinamerica.org/sarony/sarony-
photographs.html [https://perma.cc/2KBX-6Z7Z]. 
4 111 U.S. 53, 54 (1884). The Burrow-Giles Lithographic company reportedly produced 
around 85,000 copies of Sarony’s portraits of Wilde. Michael North, The Picture of Oscar 
Wilde, 125 PMLA 185, 186 (2010). Some of these reproductions were on “cigar cards” that 
were included in cartons of cigars as a collectible item, similar to baseball cards. Id. at 185. 
Interestingly, at this early stage of Wilde’s career during his lecture tour, his fame largely 
derived from the fact that he was widely pictured, rather than from his reputation as a speaker 
or author. Id. 
5 Farley, supra note 3, at 395-96. The Court in Burrow-Giles discussed this characterization of 
photography as a purely mechanical operation, stating that “it is said that . . . a photograph is 
the mere mechanical reproduction of the physical features or outlines of some object, animate 
or inanimate, and involves no originality of thought or any novelty in the intellectual operation 
connected with its visible reproduction in shape of a picture.” Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58-
59. 
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should be protected.6 In reaching that decision, they emphasized the 
creative contributions of the photographer, noting that the picture was 
made “entirely from his own original mental conception.”7 The Court 
mentioned the variety of ways that the photographer contributed artistic 
elements to the photograph, including how he posed the subject, 
arranged the costume and background, and chose the lighting and shade 
of the photo.8 Therefore, the work was a creative and original work of 
authorship that deserved copyright protection.9 
 
Burrow-Giles is a crucial example of how copyright law has adapted to 
changing technologies. While the photograph in Burrow-Giles may 
have predated Instagram and the Kardashians by over a century, the 
necessity of adapting the law to confront new challenges posed by our 
ever-changing society is applicable in the internet age, perhaps now 
more than ever. The internet and social media have transformed the way 
we produce, consume, and distribute content, and this transformation 
has brought and continues to bring about unique legal challenges that 
require us to consider how the law can adapt to the digital age. 
 
One way the internet has transformed the day-to-day lives of individuals 
and how they interact with others is through the use of social media. 
“Social media” refers to a wide variety of online platforms that enable 
users to share information, messages, and content such as pictures or 





6 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60. 
7 Id. 
8 Id.  
9 Id. However, this decision brought with it a demarcation between “art photography” and 
“ordinary photography.” See Farley, supra note 3, at 431-32. The decision focused on how the 
photographer creates the photograph (e.g., posing of the subject), rather than an analysis of the 
final product. Id. at 432. This had the implication that some photographs that did not involve 
artistic choices in the arrangement of the photograph, and were just reproductions of a scene, 
were not protected by copyright. Id. at 431. Modern copyright law takes a different approach 
to copyright protection of photographs—almost any photograph is copyrightable, regardless of 
its artistic merits. See infra Part II. 
10 Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/social%20media [https://perma.cc/7MXV-QHCZ]. Social media has 
enjoyed a meteoric rise in popularity since its inception. When the Pew Research Center began 
tracking social media adoption in 2005, only 5% of American adults used a social media 
platform. Demographics of Social Media Users and Adoption in the United States, PEW RSCH. 
CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/ 
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following and engage with their fan base, and many of them command 
massive followings.11 As one can imagine, this newfound ability to 
distribute content to the world at large with the tap of a finger has 
created many problems for creators of copyrighted works that may have 
their work shared online without their permission. 
 
The law governing copyright in the United States is codified in Title 17 
of the United States Code.12 Copyright protection begins when “original 
works of authorship [are] fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.”13 This copyright protection grants the owner of the 
copyright exclusive rights, including the right to authorize others to 
reproduce the copyrighted work, produce derivative works, distribute 
copies, and display the copyrighted materials publicly.14 
 
One issue of copyright law that has arisen out of celebrity use of social 
media is when celebrities repost pictures of themselves on Instagram 
that were originally taken by paparazzi. Many celebrities have been 





[https://perma.cc/JAH4-SB25]. By 2011, half of American adults used some sort of social 
media platform, and the most recent survey, conducted in February 2019, found that number 
had risen to 72%. Id. Sixty-nine percent of American adults use Facebook, 37% use Instagram, 
and of those users roughly 75% of Facebook users and 60% of Instagram users visit these sites 
at least once a day. Id. 
11 See The Most Followed Instagram Profiles, TRACKALYTICS, 
https://www.trackalytics.com/the-most-followed-instagram-profiles/page/1/ 
[https://perma.cc/C6K3-U6CY]. As of April 2021, Cristiano Ronaldo, the internationally 
famous soccer star and most-followed individual on Instagram, had nearly 271 million 
followers on Instagram. Id. Many other celebrities rack up similarly large numbers of fans that 
follow them; at that time, Ariana Grande and Kim Kardashian West had 227 million and 210 
million followers, respectively. Id. “Influencers” are personalities, whether A-list 
celebrities, D-list celebrities, famous fashion bloggers, or simply individuals with a 
large online following (usually on YouTube or Instagram) who use their platform to 
promote products to their online following. Chavie Lieber, How and Why Do 
Influencers Make So Much Money? The Head of an Influencer Agency Explains, 
VOX (Nov. 28, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-
goods/2018/11/28/18116875/influencer-marketing-social-media-engagement-
instagram-youtube [https://perma.cc/ANZ5-JUW3]. 
12 See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1401. 
13 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
14 17 U.S.C. § 106(a). 
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Junior, Kim Kardashian, and most recently Justin Bieber.15 Almost all 
of these suits between the paparazzi and high-profile celebrities have 
ended in private settlements between the photographer and the celebrity 
who reposted their photo,16 but these cases raise an important question: 
should the subject of a photograph possess legal rights to use the image 
for a non-commercial purpose? It seems patently unfair that the subjects 
of photographs that are taken for the most part without the consent of 
the subject, or at the very least with a grudging acquiescence to being 
photographed, would have no rights to use the photograph in a limited, 
non-commercial context on their social media.17 This is especially true 
considering that their presence in the photograph is what gives the 
picture its value; a photograph of a random person walking down the 
street is not commercially valuable in the way a photograph of Kim 
Kardashian in the same situation is. 
 
The current law surrounding the usage of these paparazzi photographs 
is ill-equipped to deal with these situations in an equitable manner. Part 
II of this Note will discuss current U.S. copyright law, and Part III will 
discuss the recent litigation surrounding celebrities reposting 
photographs of themselves. Part IV will discuss authorship rights in 
photographic works, including the concept of authorship as fixation and 
joint authorship, and Part V will offer recommendations for copyright 
doctrines that could be used to give celebrities rights to use photographs 






15 Joe Price, Justin Bieber Sued for Sharing Paparazzi Photo of Himself on Instagram, 
COMPLEX (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.complex.com/music/2019/10/justin-bieber-sued-
sharing-photo-of-himself-instagram [https://perma.cc/X2D2-7VTF]; From Gigi Hadid and 
Goop to Virgil Abloh and Marc Jacobs: A Running List of Paparazzi Copyright Suits, 
FASHION L. (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/from-bella-and-gigi-hadid-and-
goop-to-virgil-abloh-and-marc-jacobs-a-running-list-of-paparazzi-copyright-suits/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q6HC-QDEM]. 
16 FASHION L., supra note 15. 
17 However, some celebrities do “stage” paparazzi photos. See Darla Murray, A Paparazzo 
Explains How Staged Celebrity Photos Really Work, YAHOO NEWS (June 17, 2016), 
https://www.yahoo.com/news/paparazzo-explains-staged-celebrity-photos-172706937.html 
[https://perma.cc/5XPC-BQL7]. Some of these set-up photos include paid product 
endorsements, where the celebrity receives money for the staged photo sold by the photo 
agency. Id. 
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II. United States Copyright Law 
 
The federal government’s power to regulate copyrights in the United 
States derives from the U.S. Constitution, which states that: “The 
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”18 Federal 
copyright law is largely governed by the 1976 Copyright Act.19 
Copyright protection is designed to “secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ 
creative labor.”20 Copyright protection can be granted to works that 
meet three criteria: (1) originality, (2) work of authorship, and (3) 
fixation in a tangible medium of expression.21 
 
The first requirement for copyright protection, originality, has a very 
low bar regarding what constitutes an original work. Originality, as it is 





18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The direct source of the ideas in the copyright clause was the 
Statute of Anne of 1709, the English copyright statute that was the origin of the statutory 
copyright. L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 365, 374 (2000). The language in the copyright clause of the Constitution closely tracks 
the language found in the title of the Statute of Anne, which read: “An act for the 
encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers 
of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.” Id. at 374-75.  
19 See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1401. In referring to “copyright law,” this Note discusses 
copyright law solely in the context of U.S. Federal Copyright laws. State copyright laws do 
exist, and a space is carved out for them in Section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 301. However, these state copyright laws are largely constrained and preempted by federal 
law. See Marketa Trimble, U.S. State Copyright Laws: Challenge and Potential, 20 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 66, 73 (2017). Copyrightable works normally cannot be protected by states 
unless the state law right differs significantly from copyright. Mark A. Lemley, Beyond 
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 
140 (1999). State laws that apply to subject matter outside the scope of copyright as specified 
in 17 U.S.C. § 106 or state laws with respect to “subject matter that does not come within the 
subject matter of copyright,” as specified by 17 U.S.C. § 102 or 17 U.S.C. § 103, are among 
the few exceptions to the general preemption of state copyright law by federal copyright law. 
17 U.S.C. § 301. As this Note deals only with copyrighted works that fall squarely within the 
domain of copyright that is exclusively reserved for the Federal Government, state copyright 
law is not at issue and will not be discussed.  
20 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984). The Supreme 
Court in Sony Corp explained that the ultimate purpose of copyright protection is to “stimulate 
artistic protection for the public good,” and that the task of protecting intellectual property 
involved a balance of protecting the interests of authors and inventors and society’s competing 
interest in the “free flow of ideas, information, and commerce.” Id. at 430, 432. 
21 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
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by the author and that it possesses “some minimal degree of 
creativity.”22 The Copyright Act specifies eight categories that can be 
works of authorship, including literary works, musical works, dramatic 
works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, sound 
records, and architectural works.23 Photographs fall under the category 
of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”24 A work is considered 
“fixed” when “its embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent 
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”25 
 
Copyright protection for works created on or after January 1, 1978 
generally subsists from the date of the creation of the work and lasts for 
a term consisting of the life of the author and seventy years after the 
author’s death.26 Subject to a few exceptions, the Copyright Act gives 
exclusive rights to the owner of a copyright to use and authorize the use 
of their work in six ways. 17 U.S.C. § 106 states that: 
 
[T]he owner of a copyright . . . has the exclusive rights 
to do and to authorize any of the following:  
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords; 






22 Feist Publ’n’s, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“[T]he requisite level 
of creativity is extremely low; even a small amount will suffice. The vast majority of works 
make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, 
humble or obvious’ it might be.”). Unlike patentable works, a work that is the subject of 
copyright need not be novel. See Steven Boyd, Deriving Originality in Derivative Works: 
Considering the Quantum of Originality Needed to Obtain Copyright Protection in a 
Derivative Work, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 325, 334 (2000). An author can receive copyright 
protection for an original work even if an identical work exists, as long as the author did not 
copy it from the prior identical work. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corporation, 81 
F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“[B]y if some magic a man who had never known it were to 
compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted 
it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats’s.”). 
23 Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54. 
24 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
25 Id. 
26 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). This protection also applies to joint works and lasts until 70 years after 
the last surviving author’s death. 17 U.S.C. § 302(b). 
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(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the 
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer 
of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures 
and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted 
work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual 
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to 
display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.27 
 
However, these protections do not give a copyright holder complete 
control over how a work can be used. Use of a work (for example, 
reading a book or privately displaying or performing a work) is not 
included in the exclusive rights granted to a copyright holder.28 The 
Copyright Act outlines multiple other limitations on exclusive rights, 
including the doctrine of “fair use,” which provides for use in certain 
cases without the permission of the copyright holder.29 
 
The Copyright Act also provides remedies for infringement of 
copyright. Anyone who violates any of the previously mentioned 
exclusive rights of an author is liable for infringement of copyright.30 
Remedies for copyright infringement include injunctions, impoundment 
and disposal of infringing articles, damages, and in some cases criminal 





27 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
28 Christina Mulligan, Copyright Without Copying, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 469, 471 
(2017). 
29 See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-22. 
30 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). 
31 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-06. The majority of copyright infringement is dealt with in civil courts. 
Serge Subach, Criminal Copyright Infringement: Improper Punishments from an Improper 
Analogy to Theft, 40 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 255 (2014). Criminal 
liability for copyright infringement exists when a valid copyright is infringed, the infringement 
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owner’s actual damages and any profits made by the infringer, or for 
statutory damages.32 
 
As one can imagine, the technological developments of the forty-plus 
years since the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 have 
necessitated additional legislation in the area of copyright law. In 1998, 
Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) to 
“facilitate the robust development and world-wide expansion of 
electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and 
education in the digital age,” and also to implement two international 
intellectual property treaties.33 The Senate report accompanying the bill 
acknowledged the constant evolution of technology and the necessary 
accompanying evolution of the law.34 The DMCA added sections to the 
Copyright Act that addressed the circumvention of digital copyright 
protection, and limited liability for internet service providers.35 This 
limitation of liability for service providers is important because it 
prevents sites that host user-uploaded content from being secondarily 
liable if their users upload any potentially infringing content.36 For 
example, if someone uploads copyrighted material to YouTube, 
YouTube is not necessarily liable if they did not have actual knowledge 
or were not aware of the uploaded infringing material.37 
 
As copyright law has changed and adapted to modern technologies, 
previously held beliefs and doctrines of copyright law have been 





is willful, and the infringement is either undertaken for commercial advantage or financial 
gain, or the defendant reproduced or distributed one or more copies of copyrighted works 
totaling over $1,000 at retail over a 180-day period, or a defendant distributed a work being 
prepared for commercial distribution where he knew or should have known the work was 
intended for commercial distribution. Id. at 260.  
32 17 U.S.C. § 504(a). 
33 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998). 
34 Id. The Senate noted the “ease with which digital works can be copied and distributed 
worldwide virtually instantaneously,” and the potential this had to make copyright owners 
hesitant to make their work readily available on the internet. Id. at 8. 
35 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
36 See id. 
37 See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (owners of copyrighted 
videos filed an infringement action against YouTube, alleging direct and secondary copyright 
infringement due to video clips that were uploaded to YouTube). 
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of authorship rights in copyright law.38 As the means of publishing, 
distributing, and collaborating on works of art has evolved, some of the 
previously held doctrines regarding authorship have as well, and there 
is potential for them to evolve further.39 
 
III. Lawsuits Brought Against Celebrities by Paparazzi 
 
A veritable slew of copyright infringement lawsuits have been filed 
against celebrities in recent years for reposting photographs of 
themselves, taken by paparazzi, on their Instagram accounts.40 This star-
studded list of alleged copyright infringers includes Nicki Minaj, Justin 
Bieber, the Kardashians,41 Ariana Grande, Jessica Simpson, Odell 





38 See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub, Copyright’s Framing Problem, 64 UCLA L. 
REV. 1102, 1125-28 (2017). 
39 As the Number of Paparazzi v. Celebrity Copyright Cases Grows, How Big of a Problem Is 
This Really?, FASHION L. (July 15, 2019), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/as-the-
number-of-paparazzi-v-celebrity-copyright-cases-continues-to-grow-how-big-of-a-problem-is-
this-really [https://perma.cc/LRE7-7MLC] (stating that Nicki Minaj, Gigi Hadid, Khloe 
Kardashian, Ariana Grande, Jessica Simpson, and also brands such as Christian Siriano, 
Versace, and Marc Jacobs have been sued for reposting photographs originally taken by 
paparazzi on their Instagram accounts). 
40 See id. 
41 Kim Kardashian has confronted this problem by hiring her own photographer to take her 
social media pictures. Ellie Woodward, Kim Kardashian Has Hired a Personal Photographer 
So Fans Can Repost Her Pics, BUZZFEED (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/elliewoodward/kim-kardashian-personal-paparazzo-fans-post-pics 
[https://perma.cc/45ZJ-UFBJ]. She did this to avoid liability to herself, but also so that her 
fans could repost pictures from her Instagram account without worrying about their accounts 
being taken down for copyright infringement. Id. 
42 Odell Beckham Jr., the NFL wide receiver, was sued for reposting a photograph of himself. 
Lawsuits over Paparazzi Images on Instagram Raise Celebrity Questions over Right of 
Publicity, FASHION L. (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/lawsuits-over-
instagram-images-raise-celebrity-questions-over-right-of-publicity/ [https://perma.cc/68KU-
NH4R]. Beckham took a distinctly different approach than other celebrities had in responding 
to these lawsuits and went on the offensive. See Eriq Gardner, NFL Star Alleges in Lawsuit 
That Paparazzi Agency Is Extorting Him and Other Celebrities, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 1, 
2018, 3:25 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/nfl-star-alleges-lawsuit-
paparazzi-agency-is-extorting-him-celebrities-1081084 [https://perma.cc/LR7S-9WR5]. He in 
turn filed a lawsuit of his own seeking declaratory relief, claiming that Splash News and 
Picture Agency engaged in a “pervasive and coercive practice of photographing celebrities 
without their knowledge, selling those celebrity photographs to gossip websites and 
publications for profit, and then demanding payment from the celebrity for purported 
copyright infringement.” Id. This lawsuit was later dropped. NFL Star Odell Beckham Jr. 
Drops Paparazzi Extortion Lawsuit, BLAST (last updated June 10, 2019, 10:48 PM), 
2021] EWING 331 
 
 
2019 against Jelena Noura Hadid (commonly known as “Gigi Hadid”), 
an internationally famous supermodel.43 Hadid was photographed on 
October 11, 2018 in New York City by a paparazzo.44 The photograph 
in question pictured Hadid in front of a building at the bottom of what 
appears to be the ramp of a loading dock, wearing a denim jacket and 
shorts.45 In the photograph, Hadid had turned to smile at the camera, 
posing with her hand under her chin.46 Hadid uploaded a cropped 
version of the photograph to her personal Instagram account on October 
12, 2018, which was followed by more than forty-three million 
individuals at the time.47 Xclusive-Lee filed suit against Hadid on 
January 28, 2019, alleging direct copyright infringement by Hadid as 
well as contributory infringement.48 The lawsuit was eventually 
dismissed on July 18, 2019 because Xclusive-Lee failed to allege that it 







43 Ashley Carman, Gigi Hadid Wants to Rewrite Copyright Law Around Her Instagram 




5/gigi-hadid-copyright-instagram-lawsuit-paparazzi]. Gigi Hadid has been sued a total of three 
times for reposting paparazzi photographs on her Instagram account, in September 2017 and 
January 2019 for posting photographs of herself, and in September 2019 for posting a picture 
of her former boyfriend Zayn Malik. Gigi Hadid is Being Sued for a Third Time for Posting 
Another’s Photo on Her Instagram, FASHION L. (Sept. 13, 2019), 
https://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/gigi-hadid-is-being-sued-for-a-third-time-for-posting-
anothers-photo-on-her-instagram [https://perma.cc/EA4Y-7H45]. The September 2017 and 
September 2019 suits were settled out of court. Id. 
44 Complaint at 3, Xclusive-Lee v. Hadid, 2019 WL 3281013 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2019) (No. 
19-CV-520). 
45 Id. at Exhibit 4. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. Hadid claimed in an Instagram post, published after she had been notified of the lawsuit 
by her management, of an image of several paragraphs of text decrying the habits of the 
paparazzi industry, that she had found the photograph on Twitter with no photographer’s name 
on the image, and that she would have given the photographer credit if she had known “which 
of the 15+ photographers outside that day took these exact photos.” Gigi Hadid (@gigihadid), 
INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/p/BpF_uK_nivH/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2020). 
48 Complaint, supra note 44, at 5-6. Xclusive-Lee based their claim for contributory 
infringement on the basis that she allegedly made the photograph available to “innumerable 
individuals and media outlets.” Id. 
49 Alexis Kramer, Gigi Hadid Escapes Copyright Suit over Instagram Photo, BLOOMBERG 
(July 19, 2019, 12:35 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-news/gigi-hadid-
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However, the briefs filed in the case raise some interesting issues 
regarding the rights of the subject of a photograph.50 
 
In Hadid’s Memorandum of Law in Support of her Motion to Dismiss, 
besides raising the ultimate issue that resulted in dismissal of the case 
(Xclusive-Lee’s failure to allege that they had registered the copyright 
in the Complaint), Hadid also raised several other defenses to claim that 
her use of the photograph was permissible.51 Hadid claimed that her use 
of the photograph was permissible under the fair use doctrine and that 
she had an implied license for the use of the photograph.52 
 
Xclusive-Lee then argued, inter alia, that Hadid’s argument for fair use 
was invalid on the basis that the use of the photograph was not 
transformative, and that she benefited commercially from the use of the 
photo on her Instagram page, because she “maintains and supports her 
brand by chronicling her exploits on social media, including 
Instagram.”53 However, as observed by one commentator, this argument 
raises another question—if everything a model does is inherently 
commercial, is the photographer unjustly enriched when he takes and 
sells her picture?54 
 
When this issue is distilled down to its essence, its unfairness is clear. 
Paparazzi make profits from the images they take solely because they 
contain a famous individual. A paparazzo profiting off of such a picture, 





escapes-copyright-suit-over-instagram-photo. Xclusive-Lee had only applied for a copyright 
for the photograph at the time it filed the suit. Id. The court pointed to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall Street.com LLC, where the court held that 
a copyright holder cannot sue for infringement until the Copyright Office has registered the 
work. Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 4-15, Xclusive-
Lee v. Hadid, 2019 WL 3281013 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2019) (No. 19-CV-520).  
52 Id. at 7. 
53 See Plaintiff’s Opposition and Accompanying Memorandum of Law to Defendant’s Motion 
to Dismiss at 1-2, 3-4, Xclusive-Lee v. Hadid, 2019 WL 3281013 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2019) 
(No. 19-CV-520). 
54 Joe Patrice, Gigi Hadid Wants to Change Copyright Law and She Has a Point, ABOVE THE 
L. (June 25, 2019, 4:45 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/06/gigi-hadid-wants-to-change-
copyright-law-and-she-has-a-point/.  
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consensually, as in the case of Gigi Hadid, without the individual from 
whom the picture derives its value having even limited, non-commercial 
rights to the use of that photograph is not an equitable situation.55 
However, there are several legal theories that could potentially grant the 
subjects of these photographs rights to their use. 
 
IV. Authorship Rights in Photographs 
 
One interesting omission from the list of definitions present in the 
Copyright Act is that it does not define the words “author” or 
“authorship.”56 The Copyright Act provides a list of works of 
“authorship,” but does not define the concept of who or what the 
“author” is.57 Despite the statute’s silence, general presumptions about 
the concept of authorship do exist.58 Generally, it is presumed that the 
“author” of a work is the person who controls the fixation of the work 
in a tangible medium, such as the director behind a video camera or the 
photographer who takes a photograph.59 However, it has been argued 
that a strict construction of authorship as fixation can ignore creative 
contributions others make to the work—the person in front of the 
camera can make creative contributions as well.60 
 
In the distant past, fixation presented fewer issues than it does today. 
Copyright protections as they were originally created in the United 





55 There have also been many lawsuits against brands that have reposted paparazzi 
photographs to their pages. See FASHION L., supra note 15. However, these lawsuits are 
distinctly different from the lawsuits against celebrities sued for posting pictures of 
themselves. It is difficult to imagine that a brand posting a picture of someone famous utilizing 
their products on the brands official Instagram page could be construed as anything but a 
commercial use, and this would weigh very heavily against the brand re-using the photograph. 
See infra Part V.C.1 for a discussion of how the purpose and character of the use factors into a 
fair use analysis, including whether the work is of a commercial nature. 
56 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the Copyright Act 
does not define “author,” but it does define “joint work”). 
57 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
58 John Tehranian, Sex, Drones & Videotape: Rethinking Copyright's Authorship-Fixation 
Conflation in the Age of Performance, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 1319, 1321-22 (2017). 
59 Id. at 1322. 
60 See Justin Hughes, Actors as Authors in American Copyright Law, 51 CONN. L. REV. 1, 51 
(2019) (arguing that without a contractual agreement stating otherwise, an actor in a dramatic 
performance could be granted joint authorship rights for their contribution to a work). 
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extended to a limited set of media, of which fixation was “an 
undifferentiated part of the authorship process.”61 In the past, the 
individual who fixed the copyrightable work in a tangible medium was 
also the one who provided the ideas for the work.62 The concept of the 
person who provides the creative ingenuity and the person who “fixes” 
the work in a tangible medium being one and the same has been referred 
to as the “creation-fixation convergence.”63 
 
Works can have more than one author. The Copyright Act defines a 
“joint work” as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the 
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or 
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”64 Joint authorship (without an 
agreement to the contrary) gives joint authors an equal right to the 
profits and equal right to exploit the work, even if the authors did not 
contribute to the work equally.65 There are several different tests for 
joint authorship that have been proposed.66 A test proposed by Professor 
Melville Nimmer says that to have joint authorship rights, the 
contribution must be more than de minimis, even though it might not be 
independently copyrightable.67 However, this test has faced criticism for 
that it may afford joint authorship rights to too many contributors.68 
Another test, one which has been traditionally favored by courts, is a 





61 Evan Brown, Fixed Perspectives: The Evolving Contours of the Fixation Requirement in 
Copyright Law, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 17, 20 (2014). The first Copyright Act, which 
was enacted in 1790, only applied to maps, charts, and books. Id. at 21. Congress later 
expanded this protection to musical compositions in 1831, and in 1909 expanded the 
protections to include “periodicals, prepared speeches, dramatic compositions, drawings, 
prints, photographs, and ‘works of art.’” Id. at 22. Today, what can be protected by copyright 
is much more expansive, as copyright protection is not confined to the categories enumerated 
in the current Copyright Act. Id. 
62 Tehranian, supra note 58, at 1322. 
63 See id. at 1321-22. 
64 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
65 Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the 
Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 193 (2001). 
66 See id. at 195-200 (explaining various manners in which courts have evaluated joint 
authorship claims). 
67 Id. at 196. 
68 Id. at 197.  
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required to make a contribution that would be independently 
copyrightable.69 
 
With the expansion of copyright protections into other forms of media, 
such as movies, music, and other forms of digital art, what was initially 
a convergence has now become a significant gap between the creatives 
who may contribute to a work and the person who actually “fixes it in a 
tangible medium.”70 Many different individuals may contribute in a 
creative fashion to a work, especially in the massive modern media 
industry. For example, a 2017 study showed that it now takes an average 
of 4.53 writers to create a hit single, and only four out of the one hundred 
songs analyzed were credited to a single writer.71 This is an increase 
from even ten years prior, where the average number of writers on a top 
100 single was 3.52, and fourteen of the songs were credited to one 
person.72 This change has been attributed to changes in the music 
industry stemming from a desire by record-labels to speed up the 
process of song creation.73 
 
The above-referenced study only included the number of people 
credited in actually writing the song. However, one can imagine that 
many more people contributed to the creative process in various 
manners. For example, the way a musician decides to phrase a certain 
musical part and the choices that audio engineers make during post-
processing of the tracks recorded in the studio are all part of the final 
product that makes it onto the master record and eventually to listeners’ 
ears. 
 
One related area that has been explored, and which is even more 
complex with regard to the multitudes of people involved in production 
of a work, is the role of actors in their performances, and whether that 





69 Id. at 196. 
70 See Tehranian, supra note 58, at 1322-23. 
71 Mark Savage, How Many People Does It Take to Write a Hit Song?, BBC NEWS (May 16, 
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-39934986 [https://perma.cc/2D39-
EUEQ] (reporting on a study by Music Week magazine that analyzed the 100 most popular 
singles of 2016). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
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who work together in the production of a film are typically governed by 
legal mechanisms that give the rights and permissions in a film to the 
producer of the film.74 In a situation where these rights stipulated by 
contract do not exist, it has been proposed that actors should possibly 
have joint authorship rights due to their contribution via their creative 
performances.75 
 
However, this view has generally not been adopted by courts.76 Garcia 
v. Google, a 2015 case in the Ninth Circuit, was one such case that raised 
the issue of whether a contributor to an integrated work, such as a film, 
has an independent copyright in their contribution.77 The actress who 
brought the suit initially responded to a casting call for a film entitled 
Desert Warrior, which was an action-adventure film set in ancient 
Arabia.78 She was cast in a cameo role, in which she spoke two 
sentences.79 Garcia only worked for a very short period of time on the 
film, and the director of the film did not obtain a written agreement that 
assigned the rights of her creative contribution to the film to the 
moviemaker.80 
 
However, the writer-director of the film had very different intentions 
from what the film was originally represented to be.81 The film that was 





74 See Hughes, supra note 60, at 51 (explaining that audiovisual performances are almost 
always subject to contractual regulations, as generally in film production everyone involved in 
the production works for hire).  
75 Id. at 68. 
76 See, e.g., Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 2015). 
77 Diana C. Obradovich, Garcia v. Google: Authorship in Copyright, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
785, 794 (2016). 
78 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 737. 
79 Id. 
80 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258, 1265 (9th Cir.), opinion amended by 766 F.3d 929 
(9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). 
81 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 737. The filmmaker, Mark Basseley Youssef, who also went by the 
name “Sam Basile,” was later sentenced to a year in prison for violating the terms of his 
release from a 2010 conviction of bank and credit-card fraud. Victoria Kim, ‘Innocence of 
Muslims’ Filmmaker Gets a Year in Prison, L.A. TIMES: L.A. NOW (Nov. 7, 2012, 3:00 PM), 
https://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/11/innocence-muslims-filmmaker-
sentenced.html [https://perma.cc/6C49-C9K2]. Some of the initial charges that led to the 
sentence were related to the film, including that he had lied about his role in the film, but these 
charges were dropped in exchange for admitting to four other violations, including lying to his 
probation officer and using bogus names. Id. 
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Mohammed as a murderer, pedophile, and homosexual.82 Garcia’s 
original lines were dubbed over and in her five-second cameo, she 
appeared to say “Is your Mohammed a child molester?” instead.83 A 
trailer for the film was uploaded to YouTube, the video-sharing website 
owned by Google.84 As a result of the release of this inflammatory 
trailer, Garcia received multiple death threats due to her role in the 
film.85 
 
Garcia then asked Google to remove the film from YouTube, claiming 
it was hate speech and violated her state law rights to privacy and to 
control her likeness.86 She also sent Google five takedown notices 
pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512, 
claiming that YouTube’s broadcast of the trailer infringed her copyright 
in her “audio-visual dramatic performance.”87 Google declined to 
remove the film, and Garcia subsequently filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California, naming Google and 
Youssef, the director, as codefendants.88 She alleged copyright 
infringement against both defendants, as well as several state law tort 
claims against the director.89 
 
The district court initially denied Garcia’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction on the copyright claim to remove the video, which was then 
reversed by a divided Ninth Circuit panel and the film was ordered 
removed from YouTube.90 The Ninth Circuit then granted a rehearing 





82 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 737. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. This film was linked to numerous violent protests in the Middle East, and was a 
purported motivation of the infamous September 11, 2012 attack on the United States 
Consulate in Benghazi, Libya. Id. at 738. Shortly after this Benghazi attack, an Egyptian cleric 
issued a fatwa against anyone associated with the film, which called upon the “Muslim Youth 
in America[] and Europe” to “kill the director, the producer[,] and the actors and everyone 
who helped and promoted this film.” Id. 
85 Id. 




90 Id. at 738-39. 
91 Id. at 739. 
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injunction under the four-factor test in Winter v. NRDC, and found that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia’s request 
for a preliminary injunction because she could not show that the “law 
and facts clearly favor her position.”92 The Ninth Circuit found Garcia’s 
copyright claim unpersuasive, as the district court’s finding that Garcia 
granted Youssef an implied license to use her performance was not 
“clearly erroneous,” and because Garcia could not argue that the 
fixation of her performance was by Youssef and the filming crew, and 
because she did not authorize the fixation.93 The Ninth Circuit also 
agreed with Google’s proposition that giving copyright protections to 
those who contribute to individual parts of a movie would “make Swiss 
cheese of copyrights,” as treating every acting performance as an 
independent work would be a logistical nightmare.94 Garcia chose not 
to appeal, and dismissed the case.95 
 
Garcia further reinforced the proposition that authorship rights vest in 
those who control the fixation the work. However, a strict adherence to 
this authorship-as-fixation doctrine can ignore creative contributions 
that exist in front of the camera.96 A highly unique example of a case 
where the authorship-as-fixation doctrine does not necessarily apply is 
Naruto v. Slater, where an animal rights organization brought suit, 
allegedly on behalf of a monkey, against a wildlife photographer for 
publishing photographs that the monkey had taken of himself using the 
photographer’s camera.97 The suit was unsurprisingly dismissed, as the 
court found that the monkey lacked statutory standing to sue under the 
Copyright Act.98 While the ultimate decision in this case rested on the 
fact that the monkey was not a human, it does raise interesting questions 
about the ownership of image copyrights.99 If the wildlife photographer, 





92 Id. at 739. 
93 Id. at 743-44. 
94 Id. at 742-43. 
95 Obradovich, supra note 77, at 804. 
96 Tehranian, supra note 58, at 1348 (noting that “it is not uncommon for the person in front of 
the camera to contribute far more, creatively speaking, to the ultimate expressive work 
captured in a tangible medium than the person behind the camera.”). 
97 See generally Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018). 
98 Id. 
99 See Tehranian, supra note 58, at 1355-58. 
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the one who “fixed the work in a tangible medium,” and the monkey, as 
a non-human, cannot possess copyright interests, who has the rights to 
the image?100 The logical conclusion is obviously that the wildlife 
photographer, who was responsible for the production of the work, 
should have the rights to profit from the photograph if he so desires, but 
under a strict reading of the authorship-as-fixation doctrine he would 
not.101 
 
This reconsideration of the authorship-as-fixation doctrine has some 
relevance to the world of paparazzi photography. Some photographs 
captured by paparazzi inarguably do not contain any creative effort on 
the part of the subject, for example if Brad Pitt was photographed 
leaving a restaurant. A different argument could be raised if the subject 
of the photo contributed in a fashion—for example by posing in a certain 
manner or choosing an outfit.102 While it is an unfair comparison 
(despite what some celebrities may say) to compare paparazzi 
photographers to monkeys simply pressing a shutter button, it could 
absolutely be argued that the subject still does contribute to the final 
creative work and should have a  right, albeit a limited one, to its use. 
 
V. Doctrines that Could Give the Subject of a Photograph Rights 
to the Photo 
 
There are several legal doctrines that could potentially grant the subject 
of a photograph rights to its use.103 First, the doctrine of joint authorship 
has some potential to give the subject of a photograph rights to its use. 
However, giving “joint authorship” rights to the subject of a photograph 
would likely face similar problems as giving actors joint authorship. The 





100 Id. at 1357-58. 
101 See id. at 1357. 
102 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 51, at 
10. 
103 For the purposes of this Note, the discussion of a reposted photograph will refer to a 
paparazzi photograph that is reposted by the subject of that photograph with minimal editing 
or cropping, such as the photograph at issue in Xclusive-Lee.  
340 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17.2 
 
 
doctrine of fair use, or possibly an implied license for the use of the 
photograph.104 
 
A. Joint Authorship 
 
One possible legal framework that could give the subject of a 
photograph rights to the work is joint authorship.105 However, this 
approach would be difficult to implement under existing legal doctrine. 
It could be argued that the subject of a photo can contribute creative 
elements to the photograph. In the case discussed above, Xclusive-Lee 
v. Hadid, Hadid argued in the Memorandum of Law in Support of her 
Motion to Dismiss that she contributed creative elements to the 
photograph through her chosen pose and her clothing choices.106 Even 
though Hadid was not making an argument that she was a joint author 
of the photograph, her contribution of these “creative elements” could 





104 It would be remiss not to mention the right of publicity, which is grounded in state law and 
protects the right of individuals to control commercial exploitations of their names, likenesses, 
and identities. See Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask That Eats into the Face: Images and the Right of 
Publicity, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 157, 158 (2015). The right of publicity does not generally 
prohibit the use of a likeness in a context that is considered “newsworthy,” but that has not 
stopped celebrities from attempting to assert right of publicity claims in response to paparazzi 
photography. See FASHION L., supra note 42. However, a full analysis of this issue is outside 
the scope of this Note. 
105 See Part V.A, supra (discussing joint authorship rights). 
106 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 51, at 
10. However, Hadid was not making a case for joint authorship; rather she was arguing that 
the second factor of fair use should weigh in her favor. Id. at 7; see also Reply Memorandum 
of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 6, Xclusive-Lee v. Hadid, 2019 WL 
3281013 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2019) (No. 19-CV-520). Xclusive-Lee in their memorandum in 
opposition to Hadid’s motion to dismiss, as well as many of the media outlets who covered the 
lawsuit, glossed over or otherwise failed to understand this important distinction between a 
claim of fair use and a claim of joint authorship. See Plaintiff’s Opposition and Accompanying 
Memorandum of Law to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 53, at 7 (“Hadid’s 
assertion that she somehow maintains joint copyright in the Photograph . . . is preposterous”); 
Carman, supra note 43 (“Hadid believes . . . her participation in photos—from posing to 
choosing her outfit—invalidates a photographer’s ownership claims.”); Photo Co. Suing Gigi 
Hadid Says Co-Authorship Claim is “Preposterous,” Implied License is a “Blatant Attempt to 
Rewrite the Law”, FASHION L. (June 13, 2019), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/photo-
agency-suing-gigi-hadid-says-co-authorship-claim-is-preposterous-implied-license-is-a-
blatant-attempt-to-rewrite-the-law [https://perma.cc/FD28-PUXW] (“Xclusive takes issue with 
Hadid’s argument that . . . [she] should be considered an “author” of the photo, which would 
give her rights in it.”). 




The difficulty with this approach is that it would likely run into the same 
roadblocks that frustrate actors who attempt to argue for joint authorship 
rights. Consider the issue of fixation presented in Garcia.107 A celebrity 
photographed by a paparazzo plays no role in the actual fixation of the 
photographs even if they could possibly make the argument that they 
contributed creative elements of the photograph through their pose, 
clothing, etc. Also, under the Goldenstein test for joint authorship that 
is favored by courts, the joint author must make a contribution that is 
independently copyrightable.108 It would be impossible for the 
aforementioned “creative elements” to be independently copyrightable, 
as posing in a denim jacket and smiling would not be itself fixed in a 
tangible medium and would therefore not be copyrightable.109 
 
The implementation of joint authorship rights would also be a potential 
logistical nightmare. Like Google contended in Garcia v. Google, it 
would have the potential “to make Swiss cheese out of copyright 
law.”110 Since a joint author is entitled to a share of the profits from a 
work, celebrities who attained “joint author” status with respect to a 
photograph would theoretically be entitled to a share of the paparazzo’s 
profits from the sale of the picture.111 Establishing a joint-authorship 
doctrine for the subjects of paparazzi photos has the potential to tip the 





107 See Part IV, supra (discussing Garcia). 
108 LaFrance, supra note 65, 65at 196 (stating the Goldenstein test). With regard to specific 
poses, the Ninth Circuit has held that yoga poses are not entitled to copyright protection, so it 
is highly doubtful that a chosen celebrity pose would qualify. See Bikram’s Yoga Coll. Of 
India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC., 803 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir. 2015). 
109 See discussion of joint authorship, supra Part V.A. While some courts look favorably upon 
the authorship test proposed by Melville Nimmer, that a joint author’s contribution simply 
must be more than de minimis, the majority express concern that it would give joint authorship 
to too many contributors. Id. Application of a joint authorship to the situation of paparazzi 
photos also runs into a problem with the issue of intent. The Second Circuit held in Childress 
v. Taylor that the co-authors “entertain in their minds the concept of joint authorship.” 945 
F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991). This intent requirement of the joint authorship test would 
severely limit the scope in which this doctrine could be applied to photographs, because even 
assuming the “creative contribution” made by the subject of a photograph satisfied the 
requirements for joint authorship, the subject would have to prove that they intended it to be 
part of the final work. 
110 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2015). 
111 See Childress, 945 F.2d at 508. 
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Additionally, this doctrine could only potentially apply to a subset of 
photos where the subject contributed in a creative manner and had the 
intent to do so. A photo similar to the one that was the subject of the 
lawsuit against Gigi Hadid, where she deliberately posed, may have 
some creative contributions, but a candid photograph of Jennifer 
Aniston at the grocery store, for example, would not have any potential 
footing under this theory, as joint authors must have the intent to 
combine their contributions into a joint work.112 As a theory of joint 
authorship would have the potential to shift the balance of rights in an 
opposite, but also inequitable, direction, and because it has limited 
applicability, it is likely not a tenable solution to this issue. 
 
B. Unjust Enrichment 
 
Another potential doctrine that could give celebrities to right to repost 
photographs is a contract implied-in-law. A contract implied-in-law is a 
legal fiction used to achieve justice where no actual contract exists.113 It 
does not require an actual agreement or meeting of the minds, and does 
not require assent by either of the parties, and can be implied from the 
conduct of the parties.114 The theory of an implied-in-law contract is one 
that is based on equity, and that one party should not be unjustly 
enriched due to the contributions of another.115 
 
This theory has not been argued thus far by an accused infringer to 






113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1987). Unlike true 
contracts, quasi-contracts are not based on the intention of the parties to undertake the 
performances in question, and they are not promises. At common law, these obligations were 
ordinarily enforced in the same sort of action that was appropriate to true contracts, so this has 
caused confusion with reference to the nature of quasi-contracts. Id. Implied-in-law contracts 
are also different from contracts implied-in-fact, so it is important to recognize this distinction 
when discussing “implied contracts.” Jessica Nguyen, A Preemptive Copyright Ghost Lurking 
in Breach of Contract Claims, 16 CHAPMAN L. R. 437, 455 (2013).  
114 See, e.g., Thompson v. Horowitz, 37 N.Y.S.3d 266, 268 (App. Div. 2016) (citing Bradkin 
v. Leverton, 257 N.E.2d 643, 645 (N.Y. 1970)). 
115 See, e.g., Brault Graham, LLC v. L. Offs. of Peter G. Angelos, 211 Md. App. 638 (2013). 
116 Annemarie Bridy, A Novel Theory of Implied Copyright License in Paparazzi Pics, 
LAW360 (Aug. 6, 2019, 11:43 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1185445/a-novel-
theory-of-implied-copyright-license-in-paparazzi-pics. The defendant in XClusive-Lee did 
raise the argument that a nonexclusive license should have been granted because the objective 
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the unique facts of the paparazzi-celebrity relationship could possibly 
give rise to a contract implied-in-law that gives a celebrity rights to a 
limited, noncommercial license.117 
 
An implied-in-law contract would likely apply to a narrower scope of 
celebrity photographs than the doctrine of fair use. Creative 
contributions, especially those that add value (such as a pose or a smile), 
would likely give rise to a stronger claim for an implied-in-law contract 
due to the increased contribution of the subject, therefore making it 
more unfair for the photographer to profit off of their contributions. 
 
It would be more difficult to argue for an implied-in-law contract that 
granted a license for use if there was little to no creative contribution 
from the celebrity, as in the case of a candid photo, as they would be 
contributing less value and also would not necessarily engage in the 
conduct necessary to create an implied-in-law contract. This approach 
could resolve some of the issues that would exist if joint authorship was 
given to subjects of photographs.118 It has been suggested that where 
someone’s creative contribution does not reach the level where joint 
authorship should be granted, that an unjust enrichment theory could 
give rise to an implied-in-law contract for more minor contributions.119 
While celebrities who pose for paparazzi photographs should not 
necessarily receive the rights to gain actual profit for whatever creative 
contribution they make to the photographs, it seems fair that an implied-





conduct of Hadid stopping and posing for the photograph, and because of the value that she 
added to the photograph. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 
supra note 51, at 10-11. Hadid argued that the only reason that the posed photograph (that was 
especially valuable) was because of the mutual actions of her and the photographer. Id. 
However, Hadid was not specifically arguing for an “implied-in-law” contract in her brief, 
because she relied on authority that argued for an implied license arising out of “objective 
conduct that would permit a reasonable person to conclude that an agreement had been 
reached.” Id. (citing Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Maupin, 2018 WL 2417840, at *5 
(E.D.N.Y. May 25, 2018) (No. 2:15-cv-06355)). An implied-in-law contract does not require a 
meeting of the minds or the parties’ assent. See, e.g., Houston Med. Testing Servs., Inc. v. 
Mintzer, 417 S.W.3d 691 (Tex. App. 2013). 
117 See Bridy, supra note 116116. 
118 See Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 
123, 164 (2002). 
119 Id.  
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the photograph that the paparazzi will gain a profit from as a result of 
the “contribution” of the celebrity. 
 
This theory may also face preemption issues. Quasi-contract claims 
based in state law principles, such as implied-in-law contracts can be 
preempted when they assert rights available under copyright law.120 
However, a potential plaintiff arguing a claim under this theory could 
possibly escape the issue of preemption because as discussed in Part IV, 
the “contributions” made by the subject of a photograph are not 
independently copyrightable, and therefore no rights would be available 
under copyright law.121 The theory of an implied-in-law contract, while 
novel, could be workable, but most likely only in a photograph where 
the celebrity made some sort of contribution. 
 
C. Fair Use 
 
A better solution would be allowing non-commercial use under the fair 
use doctrine. The Copyright Act allows “fair use” of a copyrighted work 
for purposes such as “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship, or research.”122 When enacting the Copyright Act, 
Congress expected that the fair use doctrine would evolve to deal with 
questions concerning copyright law and new technologies, which would 
align well with addressing this issue.123 There are four factors that courts 






120 RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 13:25 (2019-2020 ed.). 
121 In the context of “idea submission,” where a plaintiff sues under an unjust enrichment 
theory for the exploitation of their ideas (which do not meet the statutory requirements for 
copyright protection), this theory has generally been held to be preempted based on the fact 
that they are seeking an equivalent right to those described in the Copyright Act. See Arthur R. 
Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An “Idea” Whose Time Has Come, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 703, 715 (2006). It is foreseeable that a court would evaluate the 
“contributions” of the subject of a photograph in a similar manner. 
122 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
123 See Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works 
in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49, 116 
(1993) (explaining how the fair use doctrine can be a flexible method for balancing competing 
copyright interests when confronted by unanticipated problems posed by new technologies). 
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1) The purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
2) The nature of the copyrighted work; 
3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.124 
 
The legislative history of the Copyright Act emphasizes that the fair use 
doctrine must be implemented on a case-by-case basis; since the 
doctrine is “an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable 
definition is possible.”125 Courts have emphasized this as well.126 The 
text of § 107 indicates an openness to consideration of other factors, 
which would seem to include if the defendant’s conduct was fair.127 
However, the four factors of fair use provide a useful starting point in 
the analysis of this issue. 
 
 Purpose and Character of the Use 
 
The first fair use factor evaluates “the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes.”128 If a work is used commercially rather than for 
a nonprofit purpose, it is less likely that the use will qualify as fair.129 
The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole 
motive of the use is monetary gain, but whether the user will profit 
without “paying the customary price.”130 Another factor in this calculus 






125 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976). 
126 See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd 
sub nom. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The determination of 
fair use is ‘an open-ended and context-sensitive inquiry’ . . . . The four factors enumerated in 
the statute are non-exclusive and provide only ‘general guidance.’”); Cambridge Univ. Press 
v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1260 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that fair use is “not a mechanical 
determination” and that the factors cannot be treated as a “simple mathematical formula.”). 
127 Samuelson, supra note 123, at 57; see 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
128 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
129 See Harper & Row Publrs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
130 Id. 
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something new, a further purpose, or different character.131 Whether the 
work is transformative is not dispositive to the inquiry regarding the 
purpose and character of the use of the work, but the more 
transformative the work, the less significant are the other factors.132 
 
In the case of simply reposting a photograph of oneself to an Instagram 
page, the work would likely not be considered transformative because 
it does not add anything, offer commentary, or change the essential 
character of the work. Therefore, the commercialization of the work 
becomes more relevant.133 When a celebrity simply reposts a 
photograph, it would appear to be non-commercial in nature. After all, 
when the average person posts a picture of themselves on their 
Instagram page, they gain nothing more than the “likes” and comments 
collected from their followers. Similarly, it would appear when a 
celebrity posts a photograph of themselves, it would also be for the 
reason of engaging their followers, barring any explicit commercial use 
such as a sponsored post. 
 
The plaintiff in Xclusive-Lee made a point regarding photographs that 
celebrities post of themselves—celebrities can use social media to 
maintain their personal brand.134 However, this is not enough to tip the 
scales in favor of a finding of commercial use. In Sega Enterprises Ltd. 
v. Accolade, Inc., the Second Circuit evaluated the commercial use 
factor of fair use where a company copied computer code from a 
competitor to study it for the purposes of producing a competing 
product.135 The court found that any commercial “exploitation” was 






131 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Plaintiff’s Opposition and Accompanying Memorandum of Law to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss, supra note 53, at 2 (“Hadid maintains and supports her brand by keeping herself in 
the news by chronicling her exploits on social media, including Instagram.”). 
135 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (Jan. 6, 1993). 
136 Id. The court also stated that they were “free to consider public benefit” resulting from a 
particular use. Id. While it may be a stretch to consider a small subset of the population having 
greater access to photographs taken of themselves a “public benefit,” it is still a factor that 
could be considered. 




Any alleged commerciality of a celebrity reposting a picture of 
themselves without any attempt to commercially exploit it for profit 
would be similarly indirect or derivative.137 While Gigi Hadid reposting 
the picture of herself may have assisted her “personal brand” in some 
form or fashion, and she undoubtedly received attention from her 
followers for posting the photo, this does not translate into “commercial 
exploitation.” This is even less of a commercial use than the defendant 
in Sega Enterprises, where the defendant was copying the code to 
further their own commercial enterprise of developing competing 
products. If there is no attempt for a celebrity to directly gain profit from 
posting a picture (i.e., using the photo as part of a sponsored 
advertisement),138 the first factor of fair use should weigh in their favor. 
 
 Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
 
The second fair use factor considers “the nature of the copyrighted 
work.”139 Evaluating this second factor hinges on both whether a work 
is published and the degree of creativity it expresses.140 Works that 
contain a greater degree of creativity, such as works of fiction, have a 





137 See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1263-67 (11th Cir. 2014) (discussing 
when use of a copyrighted work is considered commercial and stating that the lack of a 
meaningful enhancement in reputation weighs in favor of fair use). But see Soc’y Holy 
Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 61 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that a 
defendant “profited” from his use of a copyrighted work because he would experience a gain 
of recognition within his community). 
138 See Suzanne Kapner & Sharon Terlep, Online Influencers Tell You What to Buy, 
Advertisers Wonder Who’s Listening, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2019, 8:59 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/online-influencers-tell-you-what-to-buy-advertisers-wonder-
whos-listening-11571594003 [https://perma.cc/4GAW-ZPVG] (discussing how celebrities and 
Instagram “influencers” can make large amounts of money from advertising products on their 
Instagram page). 
139 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
140 2 HOWARD B. ABRAMS & TYLER T. OCHOA, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 15:52 (2019 ed.). 
This treatise has been considered authoritative by many courts regarding distinctions regarding 
the nature of the copyrighted work. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(quoting treatise); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709-10 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting treatise in 
part); Estate of Smith v. Cash Money Recs., Inc., 253 F. Supp. 3d 737, 751 (S.D. N.Y. 2017) 
(quoting treatise); Davidson v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 159, 173 (2018) (quoting treatise in 
part). 
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or informational bent.141 The scope of fair use is also narrower when a 
work is unpublished.142 
 
In the case of reposted paparazzi photos, both of these considerations 
would weigh in favor of the celebrity reposting the photo. In the typical 
case of re-use of a photograph by a celebrity, such as in Xclusive-Lee, 
the photograph has already been published, and the subject reuses it 
after they encounter it.143 Works that have already been published, and 
thus where the “first appearance” of the artist’s expression has already 
occurred, are more likely to qualify as fair use.144 
 
Photos that are primarily “factual works,” rather than those that 
emphasize creative artistic choices by the photographer, such as 
lighting, framing, or other artistic choices, also are subject to a wider 
scope of permissible fair use.145 Even though paparazzi photographs 
may involve some degree of creative choices by the photographer, 
photographs taken by paparazzi on the street, and even where a model 
was posed by the photographer, have been repeatedly held to be 
primarily factual works for the purposes of fair use.146 
 
Another factor that should be considered in evaluating the nature of the 
copyrighted work are the contributions of the subject. As discussed 





141 ABRAMS & OCHOA, supra note 140. 
142 Id. 
143 See Xclusive-Lee, supra note 44. In the case discussed above, Hadid re-posted the 
photograph of herself after she saw it while browsing Twitter. Id. 
144 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the fact that an 
image had previously appeared on the internet before it was re-used by the defendant weighed 
in favor of fair use by the defendant). 
145 See Katz v. Google Inc., 802 F.3d 1178, 1183 (11th Cir. 2015). Katz stated that 
“photojournalistic timing” is not enough to make the creative elements of a photo dominate 
over its plainly factual elements. Id.  
146 See id; see also Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 188 (D. Mass. 2007) 
(holding that a photograph of a mobster leaving a police station taken by a freelance journalist 
was primarily a factual work even though the photographer made creative choices regarding 
the framing, angle, timing, lighting, etc.). Even photographs where a photographer exercised 
control over the lighting and pose of a model have been held to be primarily factual works, as 
they were not artistic representations that were designed to express the photographers “ideas, 
emotions, or feelings,” but rather were designed to highlight the talents of a particular model. 
Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000). 
2021] EWING 349 
 
 
claim of joint authorship, but they could play a role in evaluating the 
degree of creativity contributed by the photographer, and whether the 
work should qualify as a factual or artistic work.147 After all, in many 
typical paparazzi photographs, such as the photograph of Gigi Hadid in 
Xclusive-Lee, the subject chose the pose, the outfit, and the emotions 
she chose to express in the photograph.148 In a photograph such as this 
one, she contributed much of the “artistic value” of the photograph, as 
a photograph of a model posing and smiling would have a distinctly 
different character than a more candid photograph of her walking by 
while ignoring the photographer. A photograph where a celebrity poses 
and smiles also adds monetary value—pictures of a celebrity smiling, 
as opposed to displaying a blank expression, are worth considerably 
more.149 Because reposted photographs of celebrities taken by paparazzi 
have already been published, and because they would be considered a 
factual rather than creative work, the second factor of fair use weighs in 
favor of celebrities who repost paparazzi photographs.150 
 
 Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
 
The third factor in the fair use test is the “amount and substantiality of 
the portion used.”151 Generally, the larger portion of the work used, the 
more the factor weighs in favor of the original copyright holder.152 In 
the case of reposted paparazzi photos, this factor of the fair use test 
would likely weigh in favor of the original photographer, especially if 
the entire photograph was reposted, but there are also mitigating 





147 See Part IV, supra. 
148 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 51, at 
10 (“[T]he second factor strongly favors Ms. Hadid here because Ms. Hadid posed for the 
camera and thus herself contributed many of the elements that the copyright law seeks to 
protect.”). 
149 See Daniel Engber, How Do the Paparazzi Sell Their Pics, SLATE (June 3, 2005, 6:13 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2005/06/how-do-the-paparazzi-sell-their-pictures.html 
[https://perma.cc/2VQ6-K6G9]. 
150 See supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text. 
151 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
152 Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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entire portion of a work can qualify as fair use.153 The inquiry into the 
third factor also depends on how much is necessary to copy for the 
purpose of the use of the work.154 
 
One commentator has argued that this third factor should be discounted 
in the context of works of visual art, such as photographs.155 Due to the 
nature of a visual work, such as a photograph, use of the work requires 
a greater “amount and substantiality” because images cannot be 
summarized, paraphrased, described, or quoted from.156 Therefore, 
Stephen Weil argues, the rest of the factors in the fair use test should be 
granted greater weight in the analysis of photographs.157 
 
In the hypothetical case of a celebrity reposting an entire paparazzi 
photograph of themselves, this factor would likely weigh in favor of the 
photographer, as the entirety of the work was used. However, if less than 
the complete photograph is posted, such as a cropped version, this may 
shift the calculus somewhat, as changes to the work that affect the 
original artistic elements of the work, such as framing or other elements 
of the photograph that were an artistic decision by the photographer, can 





153 Caribbean Int’l. News Corp., 235 F.3d at 24; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984) (holding that a recording of the entire part of a television 
program did not have the effect of “militating against a finding of fair use.”). 
154 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994) (holding that the third 
factor weighed in favor of the defendant even though they had copied a large portion of a song 
for the purpose of parody). 
155 Stephen E. Weil, Fair Use and the Visual Arts, or Please Leave Some Room for Robin 
Hood, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 840 (2001).  
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a copied portion of an 
image that did not reflect “key creative decisions” by the original author tipped the third fair 
use factor in favor of the defendant). In Xclusive-Lee, Hadid also made an argument based on 
the fact that she had cropped the image at issue before she posted it to Instagram. See 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 51, at 10-11. 
She argued that she had edited the photograph to emphasize her “creative contributions,” such 
as her pose, and deemphasize the photographer’s creative choices of framing the photograph. 
Id. at 11. Modifications to an original photograph that transform it substantially by adding 
some sort of value, new insight, commentary on the original work weigh in favor of fair use 
for the secondary user of the photograph. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710-12 (2d Cir. 
2013) (discussing how this factor weighed in favor of an artist who had copied entire 




 Effect of the Use upon the Potential Market or Value of the 
Work 
 
The final statutory fair use factor is “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”159 This factor is 
considered to be “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair 
use.”160 This factor requires courts to consider the both the extent of 
harm to the market caused by the actions of the infringer, but also 
whether the conduct of the defendant could result in an adverse effect 
on the potential market for the original.161 It is necessary that a plaintiff 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful 
likelihood of future harm exists.162 
 
The fourth factor also ties into the purpose of the use. If a use of a work 
is commercial, the likelihood of harmed is presumed. If the use is for a 
noncommercial purpose, the likelihood of harm must be demonstrated 
by the plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence.163 This inquiry 
“focuses on whether the copy brings to the marketplace a competing 
substitute for the original, or its derivative, so as to deprive the rights 





photographs from a photographer and made significant changes that transformed them into 
something new and different). 
159 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
160 Harper & Row Publrs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). This statement has 
been one of the most repeated in judicial evaluation of the fair use factors. See New Era 
Publ’ns Intern., ApS v. Carol Pub. Group, 904 F.2d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 1990); Cable/Home 
Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 (11th Cir. 1990); Narell v. 
Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 1989); United Tel. Co. of Missouri v. Johnson Pub. Co., 
Inc., 855 F.2d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 1988); Hustler Mag. Inc. v. Moral Majority Inc., 796 F.2d 
1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 1986). 
161 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). 
162 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). 
163 Id. 
164 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 223 (2d Cir. 2015). The court in Authors 
Guild emphasized the connection between the first and fourth factors—the more the copying 
is done to achieve a purpose that differs from the original purpose, the less likely it is that the 
copy serves as a substitute for the original. Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994)). Courts have also refused to recognize lost possible licensing fees 
from the challenged use by the defendant in their consideration of the fourth factor, because 
the crucial fourth factor would never be in favor of the secondary user if this was the case. 
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1125 (1990). Because 
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market harm that would result from similar conduct to the alleged 
infringement.165 
 
To analyze if potential harm to the market could result from a celebrity 
reposting a paparazzi photo, it is first necessary to understand how the 
market for paparazzi photos functions. After a paparazzo snaps a photo, 
most turn the picture over to a photo agency.166 These photo agencies 
then send the pictures in digital form to publications around the world, 
with the goal of selling the picture within 24 hours.167 These 
publications bid against each other for the rights to the photograph, and 
typically buy exclusive rights to print the photo for a few months.168 
 
In the fast-paced market for paparazzi photos, the reposting of an 
already-published photograph for personal use by a celebrity would not 
have a substantial effect on the market. The photographs are licensed 
quickly, and the licenses are typically exclusive for a period of 
months.169 By the time the subject of the photograph has the time to 
encounter the photograph themselves through publication by the 
licensee of the photograph and repost it to their personal page, the 
original photographer and agency has likely already made the money 
they will make from that particular photograph through the sale of the 
exclusive license.170 Therefore, there is not a possibility that the 





of the importance of this fourth factor, market impairment should be “reasonably substantial” 
to turn the fourth factor. See id. at 1124-25. 
165 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. 
166 Engber, supra note 149. Agencies manage the majority of photos, but some paparazzi act 
as their own agents. Id. Sometimes celebrity magazines and tabloids will also commission 
agencies to get certain pictures, such as a picture of a celebrity exiting a hospital with her new 
baby. Id. 
167 Id. Sometimes these pictures are sent to the agencies in low resolution or with a watermark 
to discourage unauthorized use of the photograph. Id. 
168 Id. 
169 This fast-paced market that exclusively consists of news organizations raises the question 
of whether a celebrity could buy an exclusive license to the photograph, similar to how a 
magazine does, even if they desired to do so. Since the licenses for paparazzi photographs are 
typically exclusive as well, it seems that the subject of the photograph would effectively be 
barred from obtaining rights to a photograph in any manner.  
170 It could be possible that fair use of a photograph could damage a photographer’s potential 
licensing market to magazines if the subject of the photograph were free to repost it, affecting 
the magazine’s exclusive ability to publish the photograph. 
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photograph of “significant revenues,” and cause harm by not paying a 
licensing fee, as a license would likely not be available due to 
exclusivity, and there would probably not be a future market for the 
photograph given the ephemeral nature of the paparazzi news cycle. 
 
The re-poster also does not compete in the same marketplace as the 
photographers and agencies. Reposting a photograph to one’s personal 
Instagram page does not compete with the market for licensing 
photographs to magazines, because by the time the photograph reaches 
the point it is posted to the internet and can be reposted, the photograph 
will likely already have been exclusively licensed to a magazine.171 
Granting a celebrity the right to post a photograph of themselves does 
not eliminate the market for future licenses, as it would be a narrow right 
that is constrained to the particular subject of the photo; potential future 
licensees would not have a similar right to use the photograph and would 
have to pay customary license fees. Because the reposting of a paparazzi 
photograph by a celebrity would not have a substantial impact on the 
market for the original work, this factor of the fair use analysis would 
weigh in favor of the celebrity.172 
 
The statutory factors of fair use overall weigh in favor of celebrities 
having the right to repost a photograph taken of themselves. However, 
in the fair use analysis, courts can also evaluate other relevant factors. 
 
 Other Relevant Factors 
 
The doctrine of fair use is an “equitable rule of reason,” which allows 
consideration of other relevant factors to the fair use analysis in addition 
to the enumerated statutory factors.173 The four statutory factors set out 





171 See id. However, the licensee could potentially make an argument for damages, as it could 
affect the value of their license of the work. See Harper & Row Publrs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 567-69 (discussing how publication of excerpts of a copyrighted work, which 
was in this case unpublished, could potentially affect the market share for these unpublished 
excerpts). 
172 See Engber, supra note 149 166(discussing the fast-paced market for paparazzi 
photographs). 
173 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).  
174 Harper & Row Publrs., 471 U.S. at 560. 
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in Part IV, it is unfair and inequitable for a third party to profit from a 
paparazzi photograph that derives its value from the solely from the 
subject’s presence without the subject of the photograph having limited, 
noncommercial rights to the personal use of that photograph. Because 
of the broad scope of fair use and Congress’s desire for it to be an 
“equitable rule of reason,” this unique and currently unbalanced 
relationship between celebrities and paparazzi photographers should be 
taken into account, and it supports granting celebrities the right to use 
photographs of themselves in a limited, noncommercial context. 
 
Fair use is likely the most viable solution to grant celebrities rights to 
repost photographs of themselves. As discussed above, the statutory 
factors likely support a case for fair use by subjects of paparazzi photos, 
and this solution would comport with Congress’s desire in enacting the 




A celebrity should possess legal rights to use a paparazzi image in a 
limited, non-commercial context. It is unfair for the subject of a 
commercially valuable photograph, who provides the entirety of that 
commercial value, to have no ability to enjoy personal use of that 
photograph, especially considering the exploitative nature of paparazzi 
photography. While all of the lawsuits filed against celebrities for reuse 
of photographs of themselves so far have been settled out of court or 
dismissed on grounds unrelated to the actual use of the photograph, such 
as a failure to register the copyright of the photo before filing the 
lawsuit, the issue is ripe for actual litigation of the facts surrounding the 
use of the photographs. 
 
Fortunately, there are doctrines that celebrities could potentially rely on 
to defend their potential use of the photographs. Doctrines that 
emphasize equity, such as fair use or a contract implied in law, can and 
should be used for celebrities to obtain these rights. 
